Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho ( PhD student with François Recanati).

13 Mars à 14 h30 

"Paths to Singularity : Cognitive Space and the Construction of Singular Thought"

Adrien Smith "Body Representation : structure and integration"

19 décembre , 10h 

Salle de Réunion, Pavillon Jardin (Ground Floor) 

Organisators : Santiago Echeverri, Anna Loussouarn et Olivier Mascaro 

Thursday 15th May : Yasmina Jraissati (11 am-12.30) on BCTT

The next Doc'in Nicod will be exceptionally held on a THURSDAY (same place). 

Yasmina Jraissati (PhD. with Roberto Casati) will give a talk on the 15th of May (11-12.30) about "Basic Color Terms : an Epistemological Perspective". 

Abstract  : 

I want to examine the Basic Color Terms Theory (BCTT,1969) from an epistemological perspective, by reviewing some of its main notions and suggesting a way to develop its research paradigm. The BCTT is originally an anthropological theory of color naming, which has developed in an interdisciplinary approach to color perception and categorization. 

In this talk, I shall go over its two main theses - (1) The Universal Color Semantics Thesis according to which there is a limited number of basic color terms across languages, (2)The Evolutionar Sequence Thesis, according to which these terms emerge in a constrained order. 

  

Reynaldo Bernal, May 7th (5pm-6.30pm)

In the next doc'in nicod, Reynaldo Bernal (PhD student with Max Kistler) will give a talk on " The problem of Qualia and Scientific Realism". 

Abstract : 

Could a scientific theory explain the existence, nature and properties of phenomenological experience? The answer of this question bears, as i shall show, on the position one holds in the realist / anti-realist debates about scientific theories.

The defender of qualia faces two main objections (1) no reference and individuating principle can be established for qualia for these are, by definition, exclusively accessible from a first person point on view. And (2) a scientific theory of cognition does not need to draw on qualia, since these "entities" (whatever they may be) do not play any functional role in cognition. I shall focus here on the first of these points.

For a realist, the acceptation of a given scientific theory implies the commitment to the existence of real physical entities corresponding to each of the ones proposed by the theory. Therefore, if (1) is accepted, no suitable scientific model of the mind should include 'qualia' amongst its proposed entities. On the contrary, an anti-realist claims that there can be "theoretical entities" or "non-observables", i.e. terms that are not required to correspond to any real, physical entity for a scientific theory to be accepted.   

I will here sketch a (provisional) anti-realist position, which excludes the possibility of a scientific theory of qualia as phenomenal entities, without denying the existence and irreducible character of phenomenal experience.   

Giulia Piredda, 30th April '08 (17h-18h30)

Giulia Piredda (post-doc / IJN - NASH) will give the next doc'in nicod on Wed. 30th April. 

Title : "Assessing the Extended Mind Hypothesis" 

Abstract : 

The aim of this talk is to illustrate the conceptual background which gave rise to the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) and to specify this hypothesis. I will more precisely focus on the relationship between EMH and other kinds of externalist or internalist solutions. In a second part, I will examine in detail some possible objections to EMH and give an overall assessment of this hypothesis.

Santiago Echeverri, 16th April

The next Doc'in Nicod will welcome Santiago Echeverri (doc. with Jérôme Dokic, IJN). It will be held on the 16th of April, exceptionnally from 6 to 7.30 pm in the usual room (basement, Pavillon Jardin) 

"The myth of the Conceptually Given"   

In this talk i will examine the role of normativity in the conceptualist theories of perceptual experience, and particularly the importance given to two criticisms made by Sellars against "the Myth of the Given": first, the idea that the non-conceptualists are unable to grant any epistemic responsibility to the subject of perception, second, the claim that NC theories are disguised forms of the naturalist sophism. My aim here is to answer these two criticisms, by advocating for the two following theses : first, the conceptualist hypothesis is not yet sufficient to escape from the "Myth of the Given" fallacy as some of the strongest versions of conceptualism lead to a "Myth of the Given"; second, the conceptualist hypothesis is not necessary to escape from the "Myth of the Given" as it is possible to be a non-conceptualist about perceptual experience and to preserve normativity.  

Nick Jones (Bbk College, University of London) Supervaluation and Consequence

The next doc'in nicod will take part on Thursday 10th of April, as a follow -up of the Vagueness Conference organised by Paul Egré and Nathan Klindiest. 

Nick Jones (Guest doctoral speaker, Birbeck College, University of London) will give a talk on "Supervaluation and Consequence".