Adrien Smith "Body Representation : structure and integration"

19 décembre , 10h 

Salle de Réunion, Pavillon Jardin (Ground Floor) 

Organisators : Santiago Echeverri, Anna Loussouarn et Olivier Mascaro 

Thursday 15th May : Yasmina Jraissati (11 am-12.30) on BCTT

The next Doc'in Nicod will be exceptionally held on a THURSDAY (same place). 

Yasmina Jraissati (PhD. with Roberto Casati) will give a talk on the 15th of May (11-12.30) about "Basic Color Terms : an Epistemological Perspective". 

Abstract  : 

I want to examine the Basic Color Terms Theory (BCTT,1969) from an epistemological perspective, by reviewing some of its main notions and suggesting a way to develop its research paradigm. The BCTT is originally an anthropological theory of color naming, which has developed in an interdisciplinary approach to color perception and categorization. 

In this talk, I shall go over its two main theses - (1) The Universal Color Semantics Thesis according to which there is a limited number of basic color terms across languages, (2)The Evolutionar Sequence Thesis, according to which these terms emerge in a constrained order. 

  

Reynaldo Bernal, May 7th (5pm-6.30pm)

In the next doc'in nicod, Reynaldo Bernal (PhD student with Max Kistler) will give a talk on " The problem of Qualia and Scientific Realism". 

Abstract : 

Could a scientific theory explain the existence, nature and properties of phenomenological experience? The answer of this question bears, as i shall show, on the position one holds in the realist / anti-realist debates about scientific theories.

The defender of qualia faces two main objections (1) no reference and individuating principle can be established for qualia for these are, by definition, exclusively accessible from a first person point on view. And (2) a scientific theory of cognition does not need to draw on qualia, since these "entities" (whatever they may be) do not play any functional role in cognition. I shall focus here on the first of these points.

For a realist, the acceptation of a given scientific theory implies the commitment to the existence of real physical entities corresponding to each of the ones proposed by the theory. Therefore, if (1) is accepted, no suitable scientific model of the mind should include 'qualia' amongst its proposed entities. On the contrary, an anti-realist claims that there can be "theoretical entities" or "non-observables", i.e. terms that are not required to correspond to any real, physical entity for a scientific theory to be accepted.   

I will here sketch a (provisional) anti-realist position, which excludes the possibility of a scientific theory of qualia as phenomenal entities, without denying the existence and irreducible character of phenomenal experience.   

Giulia Piredda, 30th April '08 (17h-18h30)

Giulia Piredda (post-doc / IJN - NASH) will give the next doc'in nicod on Wed. 30th April. 

Title : "Assessing the Extended Mind Hypothesis" 

Abstract : 

The aim of this talk is to illustrate the conceptual background which gave rise to the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) and to specify this hypothesis. I will more precisely focus on the relationship between EMH and other kinds of externalist or internalist solutions. In a second part, I will examine in detail some possible objections to EMH and give an overall assessment of this hypothesis.

Santiago Echeverri, 16th April

The next Doc'in Nicod will welcome Santiago Echeverri (doc. with Jérôme Dokic, IJN). It will be held on the 16th of April, exceptionnally from 6 to 7.30 pm in the usual room (basement, Pavillon Jardin) 

"The myth of the Conceptually Given"   

In this talk i will examine the role of normativity in the conceptualist theories of perceptual experience, and particularly the importance given to two criticisms made by Sellars against "the Myth of the Given": first, the idea that the non-conceptualists are unable to grant any epistemic responsibility to the subject of perception, second, the claim that NC theories are disguised forms of the naturalist sophism. My aim here is to answer these two criticisms, by advocating for the two following theses : first, the conceptualist hypothesis is not yet sufficient to escape from the "Myth of the Given" fallacy as some of the strongest versions of conceptualism lead to a "Myth of the Given"; second, the conceptualist hypothesis is not necessary to escape from the "Myth of the Given" as it is possible to be a non-conceptualist about perceptual experience and to preserve normativity.  

Nick Jones (Bbk College, University of London) Supervaluation and Consequence

The next doc'in nicod will take part on Thursday 10th of April, as a follow -up of the Vagueness Conference organised by Paul Egré and Nathan Klindiest. 

Nick Jones (Guest doctoral speaker, Birbeck College, University of London) will give a talk on "Supervaluation and Consequence". 

Gina Rini "A Cognitive Theory of Moral Intuition" - 26th March (14-16h)

NOTICE : This Doc'in Nicod will take place in the DEC meeting room. 

Gina Rini (NYU PhD student with Ned Block - IJN/NASH visiting PhD student ): 

Ethicist typically treat moral intuitions as the building blocks of normative theorizing, without much attention to the sources of these intuitions. I argue that this is unsatisfying practice qnd that it can be helpful to understanding moral intuition as a particular sort of interaction between conscious (personal) experience and non-conscious (sub-personal) cognition. I propose a particular model of the non-conscious process instantiating moral intuition, according to which moral intuition is a social capacity enabling a particular sort of prediction regarding other agents. This model, I claim, is responsive both to the theoretical demands of moral theory and to empirical findings in social cognition.  

5th March '08 (17-18.30) : Ophelia Deroy, THE LOWER SENSES: RECONCILING PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION WITH TASTE AND OLFACTION

13th February 17-18.30 NEFTALI VILLANUEVA

"HIT the road, Superman. Semantic innocence reassessed."

Abstract : several theories have explicitly defended Semantic Innocence, while acknowledging at the same time the relevance of contextual factors in determining the truth-conditions of our utterances in natural language. In this talk, I deal with an extension of the Hidden Indexical Theory (HIT) as presentend in F. Récanati (2000) and reconstructed in K.M. Jaszczolt (2007). I analyze some aspects of Semantic Innocence, and present two basic motivations for using the notion : a general one, based on the intuitive appeal of content preservation through different occurrences, and a more specific one, concerning the use of anaphoric expressions whose heads are embedded under attitudes operators. I offer an argument against the unrestricted use by HIT of the principle of Semantic Innocence for all sort of expressions in natural language and explore the logical space for the theoretical use of content-preservation through different occurrences. 

   

31st January, 17-18.30 : HADY BA, UNIFYING LF AND LOGICAL FORM,

Next Doc'in Nicod : Hady Ba, PhD student with François Récanati. 

Thursday 31st of January, 17-18.30, Seminar Room, Pavillon Jardin. 

Abstract : 

In this talk, I will do three things. First, I will contrast linguist's LF with logicians logical form. I will then argue than given the formalization of LF given by May (1985), this level is equivalent with FOL with generalized quantifiers, and LF is nothing else than logicians' logical form. Finally, I will show how this equivalence should help us in settling some philosophical disputes, such as the debate over internalism and the very nature of standing meaning. 

16th JANUARY '08, 14h00-15h30

Nicolas Claidière, PhD student with Dan Sperber, will present the next Doc in Nicod seminar, on wednesday the 16th of January, from 14h00 to 15h30.

"From Evolution Psychology to Cultural Evolution" 

Abstract : 

Since the 1980's, there are three kinds of theories dealing with the evolution of human cultures from a Darwinian perspective (Dawkins' memetic theory ; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's double inheritablity ; Sperber's epidemiology of representations). As we shall see, these theories rely on a more or less broad Darwinism and on different psychological models. I shall here give a proper characterization of each of them and evaluate them with regards to relevant empirical data in psychology.