In the next doc'in nicod, Reynaldo Bernal (PhD student with Max Kistler) will give a talk on " The problem of Qualia and Scientific Realism".
Abstract :
Could a scientific theory explain the existence, nature and properties of phenomenological experience? The answer of this question bears, as i shall show, on the position one holds in the realist / anti-realist debates about scientific theories.
The defender of qualia faces two main objections (1) no reference and individuating principle can be established for qualia for these are, by definition, exclusively accessible from a first person point on view. And (2) a scientific theory of cognition does not need to draw on qualia, since these "entities" (whatever they may be) do not play any functional role in cognition. I shall focus here on the first of these points.
For a realist, the acceptation of a given scientific theory implies the commitment to the existence of real physical entities corresponding to each of the ones proposed by the theory. Therefore, if (1) is accepted, no suitable scientific model of the mind should include 'qualia' amongst its proposed entities. On the contrary, an anti-realist claims that there can be "theoretical entities" or "non-observables", i.e. terms that are not required to correspond to any real, physical entity for a scientific theory to be accepted.
I will here sketch a (provisional) anti-realist position, which excludes the possibility of a scientific theory of qualia as phenomenal entities, without denying the existence and irreducible character of phenomenal experience.
